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Out of the Shadows: Political Action and the Informal Economy in 
Latin America. Edited by Patricia Fernández-Kelly and Jon Shefner. 
University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006. Pp. 280. 
$75.00 cloth.
Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America. 
Edited by Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky. Baltimore: John Hop-
kins University Press, 2006. Pp. 351. $25.00 paper.
Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability 
and Political Competition. Edited by Herbert Kitschelt and Steven J. 
Wilkinson. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Pp. 377. $96.00 
cloth. 
The three volumes reviewed here aim to bring informality to the center 
of the Latin American (and, for Kitschelt and Wilkinson, the broader) re-
search agenda, pointing to the inextricable linkages between informality 
and the formal activities and structures of the state. They also identify the 
positive effects of informal activities, which have often been regarded as 
pernicious. Out of the Shadows uses the new economic sociology to show 
how informal economies are embedded in social structures. It also high-
lights the role of the state in generating informal economic and political 
activities at the grassroots level through exclusionary politics and policy. 
Informal Institutions and Democracy expands the scope of the new insti-
tutionalism, investigating the contingencies between formal and infor-
mal institutions, and revealing the real workings of democracy in Latin 
America. Patrons, Clients, and Policies employs an offshoot of political op-
portunity structures to uncover the effects of development, political com-
petition, and ethnocultural mobilization on clientelist and programmatic 
citizen-politician links.
The schools of research favored in these books complement one an-
other in that all contain actor-centered elements but focus on different 
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contextual factors as crucial to explain action. As a result, they generate 
different types of information that, when taken together, present a more 
comprehensive vision of Latin America than any one type of data could 
do alone. In addition, these works draw attention to informality where it 
has sometimes been ignored; demonstrate that informality has both posi-
tive and negative effects for participants and the frameworks alongside 
which it exists; and show that, where there is widespread informality, im-
ported laws and institutions do not have the desired result of copying 
“northwestern” legal-institutional processes.
DEFINING THE INFORMAL
The literature on informality is broad but diffuse. In the 1950s and 
1960s, researchers studying developing countries discovered the impor-
tance of kinship, friendship, and patronage structures within political, 
economic, and social interactions. These structures were often explained 
functionally: where formal laws for regulating interactions did not exist, 
some basis for managing relations between individuals was necessary. To 
coexist, survive, and trade, individuals had to develop trust.1 This initially 
inclusive approach to the study of informality soon broke apart, as so-
cial scientists began to concentrate on their particular fi elds of interest—
culture, economy, politics, and so on—and then as political scientists lost 
interest. Sociologists and anthropologists continued to turn out excellent 
work on informality, but with a tendency to look at either political or eco-
nomic dimensions, while political scientists largely turned to analyses of 
the state and its institutions or to new social movements that ostensibly 
opposed and remained independent of the state.2
As is argued cogently in the introductory essays of the three books 
reviewed here, much excellent work has been done, but our understand-
ing of politics and economics in Latin America (and beyond) is suffering 
from the exclusion of informality as a key analytical factor. More than 
ten years ago, Guillermo O’Donnell wrote that “[p]articularism [informal 
exchange] is a permanent feature of human society; only recently, and 
only in some places and institutional sites, has it been tempered by uni-
versalistic norms and rules.” 3 Recognizing this, the volumes reviewed 
1. See, for example, Sidney W. Mintz and Eric R. Wolf, “An Analysis of Ritual Co-
 Parenthood (Compadrazgo),” Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 6, no. 4 (1950): 341–368; 
and Carl H. Landé, “Networks and Groups in Southeast Asia: Some Observations on the 
Group Theory of Politics,” American Political Science Review 67, no. 1 (1973): 103–127.
2. One researcher who has consistently considered the political, social, and economic as-
pects of informality is Judith Adler Hellman. See “The Role of Ideology in Peasant Politics: 
Peasant Mobilization and Demobilization in the Laguna Region,” Journal of Interamerican 
Studies and World Affairs 25, no. 1 (1983): 3–29, and Mexican Lives (New York: New Press, 1994).
3. Guillermo O’Donnell, “Another Institutionalization: Latin America and Elsewhere,” 
Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame Working Paper 
#222 (March 1996), 15.
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here make the case that informal aspects should be brought into exist-
ing frameworks and that commonly accepted models and representations 
should be changed.
In keeping with these principles, in Fernández-Kelly and Shefner, the 
informal economy is defi ned as economic activities that are not actively 
regulated by the state, or that escape such regulation, functioning instead 
according to their own rules of trust and reciprocity (1, 8). Helmke and 
Levitsky similarly identify informal institutions as “socially shared rules, 
usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside 
offi cially sanctioned channels” (5). Kitschelt and Wilkinson study vari-
ants of party competition, focusing on a particular type of informal poli-
tics: clientelism. They describe clientelism as reciprocal, discretional, and 
contingent exchanges of goods and services between politicians and citi-
zens, and view more democratic and programmatic links as policy-based 
competition among parties that target particular electoral constituencies. 
The success of both these linkages depends in part on mutual expecta-
tions, which repetition and learned behavior strengthen. All three collec-
tions essentially view informality as a set of extralegal activities governed 
by unwritten rules and sanctions known to the affected segment of the 
population.
DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES, COMPLEMENTARY DATA
Each book endeavors to draw attention to the research school its au-
thors consider most apt for explaining informality. Although all three ap-
proaches contain actor-based elements, their premises are not the same. 
New economic sociology insists that economic activity is embedded in 
social norms and traditions; new institutionalism fi nds that the rules and 
institutions of politics shape actors’ choices; and political opportunity 
structure looks to economic, historical, and institutional factors as causes 
for action. Given these premises, the three books take different levels of 
political reality as their points of departure: Fernández-Kelly and Shef-
ner focus on grassroots phenomena; Helmke and Levitsky, on institutions 
and state-level analyses; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, on the intersection of 
the preceding two interests. Researchers of Latin American politics and 
society will benefi t from the comprehensive view gained from reading all 
three books together.
The new economic sociology found in Out of the Shadows is a re-
sponse to rational-actor models, which assume that self-interest and goal 
 orientation inform behavior. Sociologists of this school recognize the 
importance of economic stimuli in sociopolitical structures and action, 
but argue that economic behavior is meaningless in abstraction from the 
social networks, institutions, and hierarchies that shape our understand-
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ings of appropriate behavior.4 While Fernández-Kelly and Shefner follow 
this approach, their volume does not directly grapple with it until Cross 
and Peña briefl y explain the school in the third chapter, thus missing an 
opportunity to advance the new economic sociology by situating them-
selves within its internal debates. Nonetheless, the individual contribu-
tions of their volume are excellent, and add many data that support the 
notion of economic action’s embeddedness in social relations. For exam-
ple, Cross and Peña show how the informal economic activities of street 
vendors in Mexico City and the illegal economic activities of crack sellers 
in New York City are able to function only because organizations, roles, 
and  dispute- resolving mechanisms create enough trust among actors to 
outweigh the risks they incur.5 Itzigsohn points to socially generated trust 
and cooperation as crucial to the success that grassroots economic com-
munities in Costa Rica, Ecuador, Brazil, and Guatemala (among others) 
have had in linking themselves to global networks. Auyero fi nds that so-
cially learned, collective understandings of political processes and protest 
underlie the explosion of grassroots responses to exclusionary economic 
policies.
It might have been helpful to structure Out of the Shadows more clearly 
around this idea of embeddedness. Instead, the strength of Out of the Shad-
ows lies in the linkage between both national political processes and poli-
cies and between grassroots informality. González de la Rocha’s research 
on urban household economies in Mexico shows that the survival of poor 
people depends on informal activities—producing petty commodities for 
trade and consumption and passing goods and services through networks 
of reciprocal exchange—that require resources emanating from the formal 
sector. Goods can only be produced, and networks established, with ma-
terials and assets generated from employment income or access to social 
programs. However, neoliberal structural adjustment has led to lost jobs 
and state retrenchment, generating a shift from “resources in poverty” to 
a “poverty of resources” (98). Itzigsohn adds that neoliberal policies are 
“anti-market” (82). Although these allow large corporations to thrive, they 
block the networks of trust essential to the success of small businesses 
and informal entrepreneurship. Similar arguments pertain to informal 
political action. Shefner argues that the poor’s shrinking resource base 
is closely linked to a decrease in nonelectoral political participation. The 
more diffi cult is the struggle to survive, the less time the poor have to be 
active in their communities. Gay, Ramírez Sáiz, and Shefner all point to a 
disturbing connection between market reform and democratization. De-
4. Frank Dobbin, The New Economic Sociology (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2004).
5. Illegal activities are a special category, distinct from informality, as Cross and Peña 
(60–61) and Centeno and Portes (27) discuss.
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mocracy has, perversely, demobilized the masses, whose demands for po-
litical rights have ostensibly been met with democracy, even as their living 
situation deteriorates and politicians do not offer real policy alternatives. 
On the whole, the contributions to Out of the Shadows are persuasively 
argued and provide excellent empirical material on grassroots informal 
activities across Latin America.
Helmke and Levitsky elaborate a clearer theoretical framework than 
do Fernández-Kelly and Shefner largely because one of their objectives is 
to reorient the new institutionalism. Since the early 1980s, an increasing 
number of political scientists have turned toward institutionalism, argu-
ing that the way in which representative, executive, bureaucratic, judicial, 
social, and economic organs and regulations are structured has important 
effects on political choices, actions, and outcomes. These scholars have 
focused mainly on written regulations of political organization and in-
teraction enforced by the state—formal institutions. However, Helmke 
and Levitsky argue that Latin American politics is marked by four types 
of informal rules: (1) those that converge with effective formal rules and 
are “complementary,” (2) those that diverge from effective formal rules 
and are “accommodating,” (3) those that converge with ineffective formal 
rules and are “substitutive,” (4) and those that diverge from ineffective 
formal rules and are “competing” (13–16). Only analyses accounting for 
these interactions render a true account of how Latin American democra-
cies function because, they say, “political actors respond to a mix of for-
mal and informal incentives” (2). The contributors to their volume situate 
themselves vis-à-vis this introductory framework.
In an excellent chapter on Chilean democracy, Siavelis explains why 
posttransitional politics in this country have been stable and democratic 
despite formal institutional obstacles. In a multiparty presidential system 
with a weak legislature, presidents should tend to overuse their powers, 
eventually leading to democratic breakdowns. However, the threat of re-
turn to military rule convinced elite political actors to cooperate. Under-
standing the problems of their formal institutions, they constructed four 
accommodating informal institutions: a lasting coalition among left-wing 
parties that has governed Chile since the transition, a quota system to dis-
tribute appointed positions among the partners of this coalition, informal 
negotiations to gather support for policy initiatives, and “election insur-
ance” (analyzed in a later chapter by Carey and Siavelis) to reward losing 
candidates in the binomial system. These informal rules are understood 
by the participants, who can enforce the deals using mechanisms such as 
the threat or reality of support withdrawal.
Mejía Acosta describes secret and informal legislative-executive agree-
ments, or “ghost coalitions,” as complementary informal institutions that 
create governability in Ecuador despite formal and institutional incentives 
for legislative stalemate. Langston analyzes the Mexican tradition of presi-
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dents choosing their own successors to maintain stability in the domi-
nant Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI)—an informal institution 
that comes closer to underpinning formal ones than to competing with 
them—while Eisenstadt treats agreements between this hegemonic party 
and the conservative opposition on compensation for accepting fraudu-
lent electoral processes, a substitutive informal institution. The strength 
of these and several other contributions to Helmke and Levitsky’s volume 
lies in their detailed descriptions of the processes at work. They go be-
yond the editors’ introductory theoretical framework to give important 
insights into politics on the ground.
The theoretical orientation of Informal Institutions and Democracy does 
limit it in certain foreseeable ways. The application of the rationalist vari-
ant of new institutionalism and the focus of all but a few contributors on 
the state means that the grassroots informality mentioned in the introduc-
tion (18) is largely bypassed in favor of more elite-driven informal institu-
tions. The reasons identifi ed for the emergence of informal institutions 
are primarily actor based. Actors create informal rules (1) whereby formal 
institutions are incomplete and guidelines for solving problems are neces-
sary; (2) whereby it is less costly to experiment with informal institutions 
than to attempt formal institutional change; (3) whereby formal institu-
tions are weak, unrealistic, or just not enforced; and (4) whereby the goals 
actors wish to attain are not formally acceptable or are illegal (19–20). 
This market-based, functionalist view of rules development means that 
in the essays that consider grassroots phenomena (clientelism in Taylor-
Robinson and in Desposato, informal justice systems in Van Cott, and 
unpunished killings by police in Brinks), they are portrayed in a more 
mechanical fashion than in Out of the Shadows, providing little insight into 
the meaning of informality in the daily lives of participants.
In Patrons, Clients, and Policies, Kitschelt and Wilkinson argue that the 
“responsible-party model” (1–2) for party competition explains only those 
voter-politician (principal-agent) links in which citizens judge and poli-
ticians strategize on the basis of programmatic issues. This model does 
not deal with the patronage-based linkages that exist in many develop-
ing (and developed) economies, in which accountability and responsive-
ness do not work according to impersonal policy criteria. To fi ll this gap, 
Kitschelt and Wilkinson construct a new model using ideas from politi-
cal opportunity structures theory, which Kitschelt elsewhere describes 
as “specifi c confi gurations of resources, institutional arrangements and 
historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the devel-
opment of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in 
others.” 6 The editors suggest that such confi gurations also exist for ac-
6. Herbert Kitschelt, “Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nu-
clear Movements in Four Democracies,” British Journal of Political Science 16, no. 1 (1986): 58.
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countability and can explain variations in principal-agent links. They ar-
gue that rational individuals act strategically within a set of constraints 
generated by economic, institutional, and ethnocultural elements. In con-
texts of advanced economic development, strong institutional promotion 
of democratic electoral competition and impartial economic management, 
as well as a relatively ethnoculturally homogenous population, links are 
likely to be programmatic. Voters perceive that long-term policy benefi ts 
are more valuable than short-term clientelist benefi ts, and politicians 
believe that rising resource costs per vote make clientelism unfeasible. 
Where economic and institutional elements are weak and the population 
is ethnoculturally heterogeneous, voters want or need a guaranteed im-
mediate benefi t, the vote is cheap, and links are likely to be clientelist.
The cross-pollination from social movement theory to party competi-
tion is innovative, and Kitschelt and Wilkinson develop a process of com-
plex causality applicable to a variety of cases. They argue that (1) strong 
electoral institutions increase political competition, leading parties to 
back closer accountability between politicians and citizens; (2) the de-
gree of economic development—market sophistication, citizen affl uence, 
 education—affects whether these links will be programmatic, clientelist, or 
mixed; (3) weak economic institutions—regulations for subsidies, licenses, 
public contracts, and the environment—facilitate discretional resource 
allocation and politicization of the economy (i.e., clientelism); (4) highly 
politicized economies slow economic development and electoral competi-
tion, as constituents support the politicians who protect their economic 
interests; (5) although ethnocultural mobilization may preexist, it may be 
caused by development and weaken the economy; and (6) in ethnocultur-
ally divided societies, people try to protect themselves from perceived 
favoritism toward other groups by creating personal networks within 
their own group, undermining impartial institutions, and politicizing the 
economy. The numerous combinations of, and contingencies among, these 
causal factors require extensive investigation to determine how they are at 
work in individual cases. Patrons, Clients, and Policies thus forms part of the 
expanding nexus between structure and agency, relinquishing a degree of 
rational choice parsimony for greater explanatory power.
The key element of Kitschelt and Wilkinson’s model—the quality of eco-
nomic and democratic development—is crucial to understanding clien-
telism. Thus, the contributors make a series of arguments leading to the 
conclusion that economic growth and transition to electoral democracy 
do not inevitably bring a shift from clientelist to programmatic politics. 
Rather, the wealth resulting from economic growth has to be redistributed 
through depoliticized institutions to provide basic resources broadly. In 
addition, education levels have to rise so that voters attain the cognitive 
capacity to weigh the immediate benefi ts of clientelism against the long-
term benefi ts of progressive policy.
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In keeping with these arguments, Levitsky’s essay in Patrons, Clients, 
and Policies explains the increase of clientelism with market liberalization 
in Latin America. He argues that the political parties that were able to 
survive the economic crises, policy change, and decline of the industrial 
working class in the 1980s and 1990s did so by shifting from labor to ma-
chine politics. Patronage machines enabled parties to engage in the mar-
ket reform demanded by certain domestic and international actors while 
delivering the goods and services demanded by other sectors through 
clientelist networks. Market liberalization slashed big bureaucracies and 
state-run economies, but clientelism survives under politicized bureau-
cracies and weak rule of law.
To come to a similar conclusion, Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, and Estévez 
use quantitative modeling to show how the PRI used the Programa Na-
cional de Solidaridad to minimize electoral risk by targeting goods to 
certain constituencies. In a piece on Brazil, Lyne constructs a theory of 
the “voter’s dilemma” (159) to suggest that only those voters who choose 
clientelist candidates insure themselves against exclusion from goods dis-
tribution should their candidate be defeated, guaranteeing the continuity 
of clientelism until voters are wealthy enough to disregard the effect of 
free riding. Medina and Stokes use examples from Argentina, Colombia, 
Italy, and the United States to bring life to a game theory model in which 
patrons monopolize goods and monitor the electoral activities of voters. 
Signifi cantly, they show that clientelism does not require perfect monitor-
ing capacity, but simply the perception by voters that such capacity ex-
ists and affects the distribution of benefi ts. As in Informal Institutions and 
Democracy, none of the contributors to Patrons, Clients, and Policies (with 
the exception of Krishna) conveys the day-to-day climate of clientelism. 
Kitschelt and Wilkinson attempt to bring elements of tradition and com-
munity into their explanation, but they, and many of the authors in their 
collection, deal too abstractly with such factors to provide an understand-
ing of clientelism beyond its defi nitional characteristics.
COMMON THEMES ON INFORMALITY
Separately and as a group, the three books make an important con-
tribution to the literature. They bring informality back to the center of 
the research agenda, examining it in daily life at the grassroots level, in 
the interaction between the strategies of voters and politicians in political 
parties, and in the mechanisms of governance. This focus is particularly 
important to political science, where informality has been marginalized. 
The books also dispel a series of myths about the negative effects of infor-
mality on politics, the economy, and the social fabric. Finally, they dem-
onstrate why legal-institutional models from advanced capitalist, stable 
democracies cannot bring those countries’ processes to Latin America.
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Informal Institutions and Democracy most clearly addresses the positive 
and negative effects of informality, because, as the title suggests, it is the 
editors’ express goal to evaluate the impact of informal institutions on 
democracy. Thus, as Desposato argues in his essay on Brazil, political rep-
resentation may be impeded where extensive clientelism renders parties 
less likely to generate cohesive policy platforms and push for democratic 
progress; yet, as Taylor-Robinson notes in her chapter on Honduras, with-
out clientelism local interests might not be represented at all. Langston’s 
piece on the dedazo in Mexico shows that some politicians keep rules in-
formal to skirt democratic accountability, whereas Eisenstadt’s work on 
postelectoral concertacesiones in Mexico demonstrates that others use them 
to increase accountability. Siavelis and Mejía Acosta argue in their chap-
ters that informal coalitions and negotiations can enhance democratic 
governability, although they may also decrease accountability and trans-
parency. Similarly, Van Cott contends that informal arrangements can at 
times enhance the rule of law, but Brinks shows that they may jeopardize 
it at others.
Patrons, Clients, and Policies is more circumspect on this issue, not stat-
ing the positive possibilities (or at least the harmlessness) of clientelism 
clearly until the conclusion. Of course, the linkages at issue in Informal 
Institutions and Democracy may more readily be defi ned as benign, be-
cause many of them have been elaborated precisely to make otherwise 
intractable formal rules democratically functional. Clientelism, however, 
more closely resembles the broader, grassroots institutions that Helmke 
and Levitsky consider diffi cult to change and that O’Donnell describes 
as a “deep sea” into which formal democratic institutions are plunged 
(in Helmke and Levitsky, 289). Nonetheless, Kitschelt and Wilkinson con-
clude on a number of important points. They argue that, in a context of po-
litical competition, clientelist resource distribution may not be worse than 
programmatic redistribution. For example, in highly fragmented party 
systems with programmatic competition, politicians still target benefi ts 
to specifi c constituencies. Among advanced democracies, and among less 
developed ones, inequality is not greater in clientelist than in nonclien-
telist countries. In peripheral regions, clientelist benefi ts are often the only 
thing poor people can get from politicians. Finally, some clientelist poli-
cies (e.g., export subsidies, tariff protection, funding at low interest rates) 
can boost economic growth where there are low levels of development.
In Out of the Shadows, the positive sides of informality are more force-
fully apparent than in the other two volumes. The contributors deal with 
poor people marginalized by exclusionary political structures and eco-
nomic policies and, therefore, focus on the necessity of informal mecha-
nisms in the struggle to survive. Petty commodity production in the home 
(de la Rocha), street vending (Cross and Peña), popular protest (Auyero), 
and voting in exchange for resources (Gay) are indispensable activities 
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for the poor and therefore are not to be judged lightly. Only Centeno and 
Portes clearly articulate a long-term, negative impact of informality. They 
explain that informal economic regulatory systems (i.e., social networks) 
may be functional in the immediate term for the actors involved but are 
dysfunctional in the long term because a modern, industrial economy is 
too complicated to operate through social networks of trust.
That foreign regulatory and institutional models do not work when 
 imported to countries with different histories and traditions is not a cen-
tral thesis of any of the three books. Yet their subject matter necessarily 
leads the authors to question what might be wrong with the formal that 
makes the informal so important. In Out of the Shadows, Cross and Peña 
point out that, although “offi cials in Mexico negotiate with organizations 
representing vendors, they consistently plan as if those organizations did 
not exist, or in ways that attempt to minimize their power” (73), because 
they copy legal systems from countries that do not have signifi cant in-
formal economies. In an afterword to Informal Institutions and Democracy, 
O’Donnell argues that the formal rules and institutions of democracy 
grafted onto Latin American reality have failed to import democratic be-
havior. He suggests that, if we wish to be more successful in strengthen-
ing democracy, we must carefully study the behavior that results from 
“common knowledge” rules (286) and puzzle out when and why indi-
viduals shift from these to those of formal institutions. Given Kitschelt 
and Wilkinson’s model of party competition, which intertwines electoral 
competition with economic development and other elements, both they 
and their contributors implicitly address the success of imported models: 
democratic elections and similar institutions cannot create democratic be-
havior so long as economic development is uneven and unequal, or where 
ethnocultural mobilization is extensive.
As previously mentioned, it would be most helpful to read these three 
volumes together, as each presents a different type of material on infor-
mality. However, I would note that they may appeal and be useful to dif-
ferent audiences. Patrons, Clients, and Policies is not always as accessible as 
the others, so I would recommend it to advanced graduate students and 
specialists only, whereas the other two books are appropriate for a wider 
public. Informal Institutions and Democracy will interest students and spe-
cialists studying institutionalist theories and Latin American democracy. 
Out of the Shadows should be a central reference for those interested in 
the grassroots reality of neoliberalism and democracy, and its chapter by 
Centeno and Portes should be read by anyone interested in Latin Ameri-
can economies. Overall, there is still a need for more integrated studies 
of informality in which researchers puzzle out how processes at different 
levels relate to one another.
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